Philosophy in this set of two volumes is a cognitive activity par excellence. Cognition is that the language expresses and it reveals intelligible objects/beings of language and the meaning to which our philosophical reflections, investigations, analysis and interpretation are not only based on but are confined to. The work is fit for satisfying the intellectual hunger of those who are sick of reading the same metaphysical, ontological, theological and epistemological descriptions in different books of history of philosophy, Indian and Western, to those searching a philosophy free from our captive thinking and also an innovative vision to meet out the new challenges in philosophy. Concentrating on cognition as it flashes by language the book analyses, discusses, interprets and critically argues most of the philosophical issues and their responses by Indian and Western philosophical traditions well conclusively. Unlike linguistic and analytic philosophies, the book is a philosophy of language. Unlike meaning-centric philosophies popular in the East and West, the language-centric approach of the book is based on the expressive nature of language. Based on cognition as it flashes, on active theory of knowledge and action-oriented view of language and its meaning, it reflects on problems, doubts, paradoxes and queries for clarity and resolve, and on that basis, utility and future of philosophy as well. Against philosophy as subjective and objective thinking, it is a cognitive reflection par excellence. These volumes cover the courses of philosophy prescribed in the universities and colleges useful for scholars and students and those who want a fresh perception to come up with the new challenges in philosophy. CONTENTS Volume I Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Scheme of Transliteration Introduction SECTION I A Critique of Philosophy, Language, Reality and Knowledge 1. Understanding Philosophy and Its Practical Utility The Problem Thinking and Reflecting Language, Thought and Reality Is Philosophy Metaphysics? Dissolving Force of Metaphysics Is Philosophy a Discipline of Knowledge? Is Philosophy Analysis? Is Philosophy a Linguistic Analysis of Meaning or Use? Critical Philosophy and Critical Thinking Controversy over the Object of Philosophy Is Philosophy a Subjective, an Objective or a Cognitive Reflection? Philosophy Is Cognitive Activity Par Excellence Is Philosophy an Autonomous Activity Practical Utility of Philosophy Philosophy, the Guide to Science and Other Disciplines Philosophy, the Discipline of Wisdom Philosophy Is a Critique of Knowledge Philosophy as Method of Analysis, Agreement and Resolve Philosophy Enhances and Encourages the Power of Questioning Therapeutic Utility of Philosophy: It Is Cure of Illness of Thoughts Cure of Desires Philosophy: A Cure of Family Quarrels Philosophy Is the Remedy for Resolving Problems Philosophy Is the Remedy against Aggressiveness and Terrorism Conclusion 2. A Discussion on Language Is Thought: Difference and Non-difference Controversy The Problem Concept of Language and Thought: Indian Philosophical Systems and Contemporary Western Philosophers Approach Critique of the Reference Theory of Language Arguments and the Counter-arguments: The Controversy over Their Difference and Non-difference Controversy over Determinate, Indeterminate-Cognition and Abstraction On Proposition and the Thought External Being and Intelligible Being Language and Possibility of Its Study and Analysis by Language Language and Possibility of Expressions Conclusion 3. Language, Being and Cognition: A Cognitive Perspective The Problem Holistic Theory of Sentence Two Approaches to Language Language and the Problem of Knowing Uniquely Real Understanding Sabda: A Unity of Garb and the Expresser Thing-in-itself, Sense-data and Language The External Being vs the Intelligible Being Function of the Word and the Sentence Difference between Experience and Knowledge Is Knowledge an Experience? Is Knowledge a Product? Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? Knowing Is Self-consciousness of the Consciousness of the Objects Disinterested and Interested Knowledge Knowledge Verity and Verification Conclusion 4. The Concept of Reality: An Argument about It as an Intelligible Being The Problem Critique of Epistemological Approach to Reality Knowledge and Its Relation with Epistemology Metaphysics and the Need of Epistemology Critique of Saṅkara’s Arguments about Reality Critique of Buddhists’ Approach to Reality Critique of Some Contemporary Views about Reality Arguments against Reality as Unnameable and Unknowable Perception, Sense-data and Logical Reality Reality: The Individual or the Universal Reality as Presented by Language Reality and Truth Conclusion 5. Understanding Language and Culture The Problem Different Approaches to Language and Culture Limits of Knowledge and Culture Culture Is Creativity Language and Culture Relation Between Language and Culture Aesthetic Perspective of the Culture Scripture and Culture Conclusion 6. Cognition and a Critique of Epistemology The Problem Development of Epistemological Thinking in the West Philosophy of Epistemology Different Epistemological Views on Knowledge and Reality Attitude of Epistemology about Knowledge Limit of Philosophical Reflections Two Types of Perception: Sensory and Direct Criticism of Reasoning and Inference Criticism of Inference: General Points Refutation of Asatkaryavadin’s Arguments of Inference Pūrvavat Type of Inference Sesavat Type of Inference Samanyatodrsta Type of Inference Refutation of Satkaryavadin’s Arguments of Inference Scripture (Agama) Practice (Abhyasa) Supernatural Power (Adrsta) Flash of Consciousness (Pratibha) Conclusion 7. Language and Possibility of Disinterested and Interested Knowledge The Problem The question of Objectivity of Knowledge Critique of Abstraction Interested and Disinterested Knowledge Meaning of Disinterested Knowledge Knowledge Is Revealed by Language Verity and Validity of Verbal-cognition Verbal-knowledge and Convention Arguments for Disinterestedness of Knowledge by Language Further Clarification on Disinterestedness of Knowledge by Language Conclusion 8. Resolving Philosophical Dichotomies The Problem Dichotomy of Logo-centrism and Meaning-centrism Dichotomy of Language-centric and Meaning-centric Views Dichotomy of Meaning as Referent and It as an Intelligible Being Dichotomy of the Wordists and the Sententialists Self-consciousness and a Resolution to the Dichotomy of Mind–Body Relation Resolving the Dichotomy of Relation between Mind and Matter Dichotomy of Mind and Language Dichotomy of Proposition and Sentence Dichotomy of Analytic and Synthetic Sentences Dichotomy of the Cognition and the Objects of the Cognition Dichotomy of the Determinate and the Indeterminate Cognition Dichotomy of the Verity and the Validity of Cognition Dichotomy of Interested and Disinterested Cognition Dichotomy of Cognitive Holism and Cognitive Psychology Dichotomy of Cognition and Desire as the Cause of Incentive to Duties Dichotomy of Experience and Cognition: Knowing about Other Minds Conclusion SECTION II Meaning Theories of the Heterodox Systems of Indian Philosophy, Russell’s Proposition, Linguistic Analysis of Wittgenstein and Cognitive Holism 9. Indian Materialism (Carvaka) on Sabda as Authority: An Analysis of Tattvopaplavasimhah The Problem Philosophical Outlook of Indian: Materialism of Carvaka Madhavacarya’s Perspective Jayarasi’s Perspective Refutation of the Theory that the Word Is Valid Source of Knowledge because of It Being Expresser Comment Refutation of the Theory that the Word Is Valid Source of Knowledge because of It Being the Expression of Trustworthy Persons Comments Refutation of the Theory that the Vedas Are Valid Source of Knowledge because of They Being Unauthored (Apauruseya) Comments Refutation of the Theorists that Accept Sabda as Valid Source of Knowledge because of It as Pointer to Intention (Vivaksa) as the Meaning Comments Refutation of Vaiyakaranas Who Hold Verbal-Cognition by Correct Form of the Word (Sadhupada-padartha) Refutation of Sphota Theory of Vaiyakaranas Refutation of the Arguments about the Definitioned Correctness of the Word Refutation of the Arguments that the Use of the Word Creates Merit and Demerit Comments General Comments on Jayarasi’s Arguments for Refutation of Word (Sabda) as Valid Source of Knowledge Comments 218 10. Jainas Theory of Language and Indescribability of Reality The Problem Relativistic Philosophy of the Jainism Substance and the Logic of Syadvada Sevenfold Judgements Jainas Theory of Language as Representation/Reference and Knowledge Knowledge and the Question of Describability Conclusion 11. Apoha and the Meaning of Religious Ideas of Buddhism The Problem Is Language (Sabda) an Independent Source of Knowledge? Reason Behind the Theory of Negation of Negation Meaning as Constructed Identity Theory of Apoha Two Sorts of Reality and Two Categories of Sources of Knowing Them: Is Apoha not a Third Category of Reality? Language and Religious Experience Meaning of Religious Ideas Arguments Against Apoha An Evaluation Conclusion 12. A Critique of Bertrand Russell’s Concept of Proposition: An Indian Perspective The Problem What Is a Proposition According to Russell? Sentence and the Proposition Is Proposition the Meaning of a Sentence? Propositions Are the Sort of Things that Can Be Analysed and thus Have Parts A Proposition Is Either True or False Reason for Postulating the Notion of Proposition First Argument Second Argument Third Argument Proposition as a Unity About the Meaning of a Word What Is a Term? The Problem of Empty Names Distinction between Being and Existence Nyaya View Nyaya Position on Sentence Vaiyakarana’s Position Conclusion 13. A Critique of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Linguistic Analysis: An Indian Perspective Wittgenstein’s Problem of Philosophization in Investigations Language and Representation Conceptualization of Representation Further Comments on Representation Theory Linguistic Analysis: A Therapeutic Remedy Meaning of the Word Is Its Use in a Sentence Sentences Are Meaningful Only when They Are Used to Say Something A Critique of the Concept and the Conception The Problem about the Cognitive Ground of Contextual-meaning Convention Is Analysis of Language the Analysis of Thought? Only Language Determinates Meaning Even in Case It Is Use Cause of Identical Cognition of the Use Conclusion 14. Analysing Language and Communication The Problem Is Intention Communicable? What Do We Mean by Communication? Conversation and Communication The Cause of Incentive to the Production of Articulations An Analysis of the Activities from the Speaker’s Side An Analysis of Activities from the Audience Side Production and Transmission of Articulate Utterances A Critique of Chomsky’s View of Communication Conclusion 15. The Nature of Language and the Logic of Translation and Analysis The Problem Three Models of Interpretation of Translation Two Popular Logics of Translation Critic of Matilal’s Observation on Translation Problem of Good and Bad Translation Response to Derrida’s Objection on Transcendental Signified Nature of the Language and Analysis An Examination of the Possibility of Analysis Conclusion 16. Cognitive Holism: Cognitive Holistic Philosophy of Language and Its Practical Utility The Problem Difference between Knowledge and Cognition Difference between Higher Knowledge and Pure Knowledge Controversy over Potency of Language Both the Word and the Sentence Are Expressers (Vacaka) Non-difference of Language and Thought Language as Expression vs Representation Controversy between the Meaning-oriented and Language-oriented Views Meaning and Convention Are Intelligible Beings Abstractions? Word Holism Sphota Holism (Sphotavada) Sentence Holism Sentence Holism and the Logic of Propositions as Abstraction Meaning Holism (Akhanḍavakyarthavada) Holistic Interpretation of the Meaning of Negative Sentences Cognitive Holism Knowledge Is Determinate Reason for Accepting Meaning as Universal Practical Utility of Cognitive Holism Cognitive Holism on Controversy of Disinterested vs Interested Knowledge Holistic Philosophy of Relation Thinking Philosophically Is Thinking Independently of Passionate Interests and Allegiances to Things and Ideologies Living One’s Own Life and Experiences Remedial Uses of Cognitive Holism Conclusion Bibliography Index Volume II Scheme of Transliteration List of Abbreviations SECTION III Theories of Language, Verbal-Cognition,Expression and Interpretation 1. Sphota Theory of Language: Dynamics of the Sphota The Problem Background of Bhartrhari’s Sphota Theory of Language/Sentence Holism Patanjali’s Definition of Language (Sabda) Later Works on Sphota Theory of Language Metaphysical Ground of Language (Sabda) Levels of the Language Gross Level of Language: The Articulate Utterances (Vaikhari) Middle Level of Language: The Expresser (Madhyama-sabda) or the Language as Thought Highest Level of Speech: Language as the Consciousness (Pasyanti) A Fourth Level of Language: Para Concept of Sabda-Brahman (Language principle) Grounds for designating Sabda as Brahman Proof for the Existence of Sabda as Brahman Sabda as beginingless, Endless and Imperishable Brahman (Anadinidhanamaksaram) Sabda is Eternal Sabda-brahman is Creative force Sabda is the Cosmic seed Sabda-brahman is One and A Non-dual Reality Etymological Derivation of the Word Sphota The Sabda Disposionality of Mind (Sabda-Bhavana) Concept of Sphota Nature of Sphota Sphota Is Eternal Sphota Is an Ubiquitous Principle Sphota Is a Philosophical/Intelligible Being Sphota Is a Unit of Awareness Sphota Is the Flashing of Consciousness Sphota: The Expresser Sphota Is Sequenceless Sphota Is Indivisible Sphota Is Universal Sphota Is the Cause of Articulation and the Object of Verbal Cognition Is Sphota Intrinsically Inexpressible? Three Theories Regarding the Original Unit of Language Theory of Letters as the Original Unit of Language (varna-sphota) Theory of Word as the Original Unit of Language (pada-Sphota) Theory of Sentence as the Original Unit of Language (vakya-sphota) Kinds of Sphota Vyakti-Sphota (individual) and Jati-Sphota (universal) Divisible (Sakhanda) and Indivisible (Akhanda) Sphota Difference between the Concept of Sphota and the Proposition The Expresser (Sphota) and the Verbal Noises (Dhvani) Three Theories Regarding Emergence of Articulate Utterances (Dhvaniyan) Theory of Air Theory of Atom Theory of Knowledge or Consciousness Kinds of Articulate Utterances (Dhvaniyan): Prakrta-Dhvani and Vaikrta-Dhvani Three Theories Regarding the Manifestation of Sphota by the Verbal Utterances On the Pattern of Universal On the Pattern of Light of the Lamp On the Pattern of Mirror-Image Three Theories Regarding the Role of Verbal noises in the Manifestation of Sphota Verbal noises Act on the Auditory Sense Only Verbal noises Act on Sphota only Verbal noises Act on both: On the Auditory sense and on Sphota as well Three Theories Regarding Cognition of Sphota and Articulate Utterances (Dhvaniyan) Problem of Relation between the Expresser (Vacaka) and the Expressed (Vacya) Sphota and the Problem of the Identical-Cognition Kumarila’s Arguments against Bhartrhari’s Theory of Manifestation of Sphota and Their Solution The Concept of the Meaning Revealed by Sphota Sphota and Non-Existence (Abhava), Non-Entity (Alika) and Empty Concepts Jayanta Bhatta’s Arguments against Sphota Solution to Jayanta Bhatta’s Objections Mimamsakas’ Objections against Sphota Solution to the Mimamsakas’ Arguments against Sphota Concluding Remarks 2. Indivisibility Theory of Language The Problem: Constructionists and Indivisiblists Controversy Arguments of Constructionists’ against Indivisiblists’ Thesis A Reply to the Objections Indivisibility of the Sentential-meaning Indivisibility of the Negative Compounds and the Complex Formations Indivisible Knowledge and Utility of Analysis Conclusion 3. Autonomy Theory of Language The Problem Critique of Contemporary Western Views on Autonomy of Language Autonomy of Language and Cognition Critique of the Ontological Holism of Sankara Understanding Objects of Cognition in the Autonomy Thesis of Language Understanding Language from the Autonomy Perspective of It Metaphysical Understanding of Language Cognitive Understanding of Language Nature of the Signifier and the Autonomy Thesis: A Reply to J. Derrida Response to the Nyaya–Vaisesika’s Arguments against the Infusion Thesis of Language and Cognition Can Proposition Be Autonomous?: A Statement about Autonomy of Sentence Autonomy of Language, the Intelligible Being Autonomy Thesis and the Question of Verity and Validity Critique of Ontological Commitment of Language Conclusion 4. Concept of Sentence: The Expresser The Problem Theory of Sentence as the Original Unit of Language Critique of Eightfold Definitions of the Sentence The Verb is a Sentence (Akhyato Sabdah Vakyam) A Sentence Is an Association of Words (Samghatovakyam) A Sentence Is the Universal Inhering in an Association of Words (Samghatavartini Jati) Sequence involved in using Words Is Sentence (Kramah-vakyam) Beginning Word of a Sentential Set is the Sentence (Adyampadam-vakyam) All Words Are Independent but Serve as Sentence When Expected Collectively for a Complete Sense (Prthaka Sarvampadam Sakanksam-vakyam) The Sentence Is an Indivisible Whole (Eko ’nvayah Sabdah) The Sentence Is a Sequenceless Intelligible Being (Buddhyanusamhrti Vakyam) Conclusion 5. Theories of Verbal-cognition and the Sentential-meaning: Vakyartha-Bodha The Problem: What Do We Mean by Verbal-cognition? Four Conditions of Verbal-cognition or the Criteria of a Valid Sentence Expectancy (Akanksa) Consistency (Yogyata) Contiguity or Juxtaposition (Asatti) Knowledge of the Purport or Intention (Tatparya) Convention Fivefold Definitions of Sentential-meaning Theories of Verbal-cognition Theory of Expression Precedes Relation (Abhihitanvayavada) Forms of Abhihitanvayavada Association or Relation of Word-meanings Is Sentential-meaning (Samsarga-vakyartha) Sentential-meaning Is the Word-meanings Reposed for an Individual (Nirakanksapadartha-Vakyartha) Purpose Involved in the Use of Words Is the Sentential-Meaning (Prayojana-Vakyartha) An Examination of Abhihitanvayavada Theory of Relation Precedes [removed]Anvitabhidhanavada) Forms of Anvitabhidhanavada Sentential-Meaning is cognized by the Mutually Connected Word-Meaning (Samsrsta-vakyartha) An Action Expected by a Verb Is Sentential-meaning (Kriya-vakyartha) An Examination of Anvitabhidhanavada Theory of Indivisible Flash (Pratibha) as Sentential-Meaning Categories of Flashes (Pratibha) Svabhava (one’s Nature) Carana (One’s Practice of Moral Conduct) Yoga-Nimitta Pratibha (Superhuman Flashes) Adrsta-Nimitta Pratibha (Flashes Caused by Unseen Forces) Abhyasa-nimitta Pratibha (Flashes Burst Forth by Training and Practice) Visistopahita Pratibha (Flashes by the Power Graced by Seers, Sages and Gods) Jayanta Bhatta’s Arguments against Pratibha-vakyartha A reply to Jayanta’s Arguments Conclusion 6. A Critique of the Meaning of Moral Language The Problem Centrality of the Duty in Scriptures Critique of “Is–Ought” Dichotomy in Contemporary Ethical Theories Critique of Emotive Theory Critique of Prescriptive Theory Expressive Theory of Moral Sentences Indian View of Action-Oriented Language Types of Vedic Sentences Expressive Meaning of Moral Language and the Problem of Validity Meaning of Religious Language Conclusion 7. Meaning of Negative Expressions (Abhava): Philosophy of Being of Ontic Non-Being The Problem On Negative Sentences Negation as Intelligible Being Critic of Ontic Commitment of Language Critic of Satkaryavadin’s View of Negation as Ontic Being Critic of Asatkaryavadin’s View of Negation as Ontic Being Critic of Vaisesika’s Arguments on Non-Existence as Ontic Being Truth Condition of Assertions Regarding Non-Existence Conclusion 8. Text and Rules of Interpretation The Problem: What Do We Mean by a Text? Vedas: The Text Problem of Identity and Difference of the Text Euro-German Hermeneutic Movement Mimamsa Method of Interpretation Mimamsa Method Is Scientific Sixfold Approach to the Interpretation Elementary Principles of Interpretation Comprising of Following Rules General Rules of Interpretation Specific Rules of Discrimination and Determination of the Text General Principles of the Application of the Text Follow Thus Rules of Primacy of Sruti and Interpretation of Smrti Texts and Usage Bhartrhari on Interpretation of Conflicting Cases of Sruti and Smrti Three Ways of Interpretation of a Text Prescriptive Sentences (Vidhi-vakyas) Prohibitive Sentences (Pratisedha-vakyas) Difference of Meaning by Interpretation of Words and of the Sentence as a Whole Interpretation of the Word-Meaning Conclusion SECTION IV A Critique of the Word, the Word–Meanings and Relation 9. Analysis of the Word and the Word-meanings The Problem Cognitive Analysis of Language Grammatical Analysis of Language: Kinds of Words Analysis of Cognition by a Word Word-universal (Sabda-jati) Specific Word-universal (Visesa Sabda-jati) Meaning-universal (Artha-jati) Specific meaning-universal (Visesa Artha-jati) Three Ways of Interpreting the Imposition of Meaning-universal Analysis of Process of Cognition From the Speaker’s Point of View From the hearer’s point of view Analysis of Meaning of a Word Expressive of an Accomplished Character Universal (Jati) Individual (Vyakti) Gender (Linga) Number Accessories (Sadhana) Analysis of the Meanings Conveyed by Verbs Action (Kriya) Instrumental Cases (Karaka) Time (Kala) Number (Samkhya) Person (Purusa) Mood (Upagraha) Analysis of the Measures by Which the Meanings Are Known in a Sequence Contiguity (Pratyasatti) Great-concern (Mahavisayatva) Degree of Excellence (Abhivyaktenimittopavyanjana-prakarsa) Expectancy or Desire to Grasp (Upalipsa) Favourable Incentive from the Cause of the Cognition of Meaning (Bijavrttilabhanugunya) Eightfold Means of Learning the Meaning of Words (Saktigrahopaya) Grammar (Vyakarana) Analogy (Upamana) Dictionary (Kosa) Word of Reliable persons (Apta-vakya) Communication (Vyavahara) Context of the Sentence (Vakyasesa) Derivation and definition (Vivrti) Juxtaposition (Siddhapada sannidhya) Analysis of “Words Express All Meanings” (Sarve Sarvartha Vacakah) Analysis of the Meaning of Proper Names Analysis of the Cause of Identical Cognition Group (Samuha) Resemblance (Sadrsya) Universals (Samanya) Capacity (Samarthya) Word–Meaning Relation and the Cause of Identical Cognition Difference between Knowledge and the Object of Knowledge Knowledge and No-knowledge Between Verity and Validity of Knowledge Conclusion 10. A Critique of the Substance: The Meaning of the Word-meanings The Problem Substance as a Transcendental Absolute (Parmarthika Dravya) Substance as Intelligible Being (Samavyavaharika Dravya) First Perspective: Substance and the Problem of Language as Reference Second Perspective: Substance and the Language as the Expresser Substance as the Language Presents It Conclusion 11. Critique of the Universal: The Meaning of the Word-meanings (Padartha) The Problem Analysis of Word-universal and the Meaning-universal A Reply to Naiyayikas’ and Vaisesikas’ Arguments against the Universal as the Meaning of Words Universal and the Possibility of the Expressions Number and the Universal Universal: The Cause of Identical Cognition Is Universal a Perceived Entity? Difference between Knowledge and Universal Conclusion 12. Potency of the Language: Resolving the Controversy between Indian Schools of Philosophy and Rhetoricians The Problem What Does the Term Sabda (Language) Mean? Are Incorrect Words Power?: The Theorists’ Controversy What Does Potency Mean? Are Both the Words and Sentences Power? Potency, the Natural Fitness of Words Rhetoricians’ View of Potency of Language (Abhidha, Laksana and Vyanjana) Primary meaning (Mukhyartha) Figurative–power (Laksana-sakti): its Characteristics Obstruction of the Primary Meaning (Mukhyartha Badha) Substitution of a Meaning Associated with the Primary Meaning Conventional and Purposive (Rudhi and Prayojanavati) Kinds of Figurative Meaning: Nyaya and Advaita Vedanta Jahatsvartha-Laksana Ajahatsvartha-Laksana Jahatajahatsvartha-Laksana Kinds of Figurative Meanings According to Visvanatha and Mammata Suddha-Laksana Gauni-Laksana Upadana-Laksana and Laksana-laksana Upadana-Laksana Laksana-Laksana Saropa-laksana (by imposition of Figurative meaning) and Sadhyavasana Saropa-laksana (by Imposition of Figurative Meaning) Sadhyavasana Analysis of Implied Power (Vyanjana) Sabdi-vyanjana and Arthi-Vyanjana: their kinds Sabdi-Vyanjana Arthi-Vyanjana Purpose of Accepting Language Is Power Further Clarification about “Language Is Power” and “Powers in Language” Conclusion 13. Philosophy of Relation between Language and Meaning The Problem Intelligible Beings and Relation Relation Is Defined as That to Be Found in between the Two (Dvista) Relation Is Eternally Dependent Relation Is Natural Fitness of the Language (Yogyata) Cause–Effect Relation Relation Is Neither an External Nor an Intelligible Being Relation and the Problem of Synonyms and Polysemy Criticism of Vaiyakarana’s View of Relation Relation and Convention Conclusion 14. The Philosophy of Grammar The Problem Controversy on the Primacy of Language vs Grammar Language Embedded in Grammar vis-à-vis Grammar Embedded in Language Grammar Is Practice Grammar (Vyakarana) Is Smrti Patanjali’s Definition of Grammar Grammar Is the Discipline of Learning Language and Cultivating Thoughts (Sabdanusasana) Purpose of Learning Grammar According to Patanjali Bhartrhari on Grammar Grammar and Critique of Laws of Thoughts Grammar Is Never an Ideal Meaning and Grammar Is Grammar Convention? Conclusion 15. Syntactic and Semantic Analysis: Cognitive Holistic Perspective The Problem Advantage of Analysis in a Philosophy of Language Two Sorts of Word-meaning (Padartha) Semantically Fixed (Sthitalaksana-padartha) Syntactically Analysed (Apoddhara-padartha) Two Ways of Syntactical Analysis Syntactical Analysis of Word-Meanings from the Sentential-Meaning Syntactical Analysis of a Word-Meaning from Some Other Word-Meaning Technique of Syntactical Analysis Meaning of the Prakrti and Pratyaya Three Theories about the Meaning of Suffixes (Pratyayartha) Philosophical Analysis and Syntactical Analysis What Is Philosophical Analysis? Conclusion 16. Contextual Meaning: Intended and Non-intended Meaning Determination of Word-meaning The Problem Meaning as Referent vs It as Intelligible Being Word-meaning in an Analytic Scheme Three Categories of the Word-meaning Grounds for the Determination of Intended Meaning (Gaunartha Nirnaya) Purpose, Situation–context and Proximity with Another Word Base and That Which is Based on It More or Less of the Properties Indicated by Word Similarity Inversion Form and Potency (Rupa-sakti) Dull-witted Criterion of Deciding Meanings Determination of Non-intended Meaning Inversion of the sense of primary and secondary (Gunapradhanata-viparyaya) Non-expectancy of a Part of Meaning (Padarthaikadesa-vivaksa) Non-expectancy of the Complete Meaning of the Word (Sakalapadartha-vivaksa) Non-intended Meaning is Known by Implication Without a Relegation of the Expressive Meaning of the Word (Upattapadarthaparityagainaiva ‘nyarthopalaksana) Determinants of Contextual Meaning The Sentence of which the word is a part (Vakyata) Context (Prakarana) Meaning of Another Word of the Sentence (Artha) Propriety (Aucitya) Place (Desa) Time (Kala) Association (Samsarga) Dissociation (Viprayoga) Resemblance (Sahacarya) Opposition (Virodha) Indication from Other [removed]Linga) Proximity of Another word (Sabdantara Sannidhana) Capacity (Samarthya) Gender (Vyakti) Accent (Svara) Some Grammatical Determinants of Word-meaning Conclusion 17. Critical Estimate Bibliography Index